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Namibia - The Quest for the
Legal Status of A Mandate:
An Impossible Dream? t
The case of the mandate of South Africa over Namibia (South
West Africa) has been argued, as the following note is written (early
May, 1971), on application by the Security Council of the United
Nations for an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice.
Various phases of this case have been litigated and decided by the
Court since 1949. The latest-present-phase of the matter will prob-
ably be determined in the near future. However, the matter is consid-
ered to be of such interest as to warrant the present r~sum of the
litigation up to this time.
Editor
During the existence of the League of Nations, a mandate over South
West Africa was given to South Africa, but following the dissolution of the
League and the advent of the United Nations, serious questions arose as to
the legal status of the mandate, and the performance of South Africa
thereunder, and this mandated territory has been the subject of lengthy
discussions in, and resolutions by, the United Nations, and extensive
proceedings before the International Court of Justice.
By letter dated December 19, 1949, the Secretary-General of the United
Nations, pursuant to Resolution 338(IV) of the General Assembly adopted
December 6, 1949, requested the International Court of Justice for an
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• advisory opinion on the "International Status of South West Africa"; and
after having considered written statements submitted by Egypt, South
Africa, the United States, India and Poland, and heard the Secretary-
General of the United Nations and representatives of the Philippines and
South Africa, the Court issued its advisory opinion on July 11, 1950 (Folio
No. 10; ICJ Reports 1950, p. 128).
The Court held unanimously that South West Africa is a territory under
the international mandate assumed by South Africa on December 17,
1920; and, by twelve votes to two, that South Africa still had the in-
ternational obligations stated in Article 22 of the Covenant of the League
of Nations and in the mandate, as well as the obligations to transmit
petitions from inhabitants of that territory, and to submit the petitions and
annual reports to the United Nations; and that the International Court of
Justice replaces the Permanent Court of International Justice for purposes
of such references. The Court also held unanimously that Chapter XII of
the Charter is applicable to South West Africa in the sense that it provides
a means by which the territory may be brought under the Trusteeship
System and, by eight votes to six, that the provisions of that Chapter do
not impose on South Africa a legal obligation to place the territory under
the Trusteeship System. Finally, the Court held, also unanimously, that
South Africa, acting alone, is not competent to modify the international
status of South West Africa, such competency resting only with South
Africa acting with the consent of the United Nations.
Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 904(IX) dated November 23,
1954, the Secretary-General requested, by letter of December 2, 1954, an
advisory opinion by the Court as to "Voting Procedure on Questions
Relating to Reports and Petitions concerning the Territory of South West
Africa." The United States, India and Poland submitted written state-
ments; Israel and China referred to their views expressed in the General
Assembly; and Yugoslavia invited the Court's attention to its prior Adviso-
ry Opinion (Folio No. 10, supra). No State having requested to be heard,
the Court held no public hearing, and on June 7, 1955, rendered its
Advisory Opinion (Folio No. 24; ICJ Reports 1955, p. 67).
It was the unanimous decision of the Court that the rule of the General
Assembly-"Decisions of the General Assembly on questions relating to
reports and petitions concerning the Territory of South-West Africa shall
be regarded as important questions within the meaning of Article 18,
paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations"-was a correct in-
terpretation of its Advisory Opinion of July 11, 1950, supra.
Again, on December 19, 1955, the Secretary-General of the United
Nations requested an Advisory Opinion of the Court pursuant to a resolu-
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tion of the United Nations [Resolution 942(X), dated December 3, 1955],
this time on "Admissibility of Hearings of Petitioners by the Committee on
South West Africa." The General Assembly had, in 1953, by resolution,
created the Committee to examine petitions submitted to it or to the
Secretary-General by inhabitants of the mandated territory, and to report
to the Assembly on conditions in the territory. In its opinion of July 11,
1950, supra, the Court had held that "the degree of supervision to be
exercised by the General Assembly should not.., exceed that which ap-
plied under the Mandates System, and should conform as far as possible to
the procedure followed in this respect by the Council of the League of
Nations." (ICJ Reports 1950, p. 138). It was submitted that because the
Permanent Mandates Commission created by the Council of the League of
Nations had never held oral hearings on such petitions, the Committee on
South West Africa could not be given authority by the General Assembly
to do so.
After receiving written statements from the United States and China,
and reference by India to its views expressed in the General Assembly,
and having heard an oral presentation by the United Kingdom, the Court
handed down its Advisory Opinion on June 1, 1956, holding, by a vote of
eight to five, that the grant of oral hearings to petitioners by the Committee
on South West Africa would be consistent with the Advisory Opinion of
the Court of July 11, 1950 (Folio No. 31; ICJ Reports 1956, p. 23).
The South West Africa mandate thereafter remained in status quo, with
its many basic questions not only unanswered but unasked, until October
28, 1960, when Ethiopia and Liberia each filed separate, but almost identi-
cal, applications with the International Court of Justice (registered Novem-
ber 4, 1960, as Folios Nos. 46 and 47), 1 instituting proceedings against the
Government of South Africa concerning the continued existence of the
mandate for South West Africa, and the duties and performance of South
Africa, as mandatory thereunder, the applicants having alleged that South
Africa had violated, and continued to violate, certain articles of the man-
date and Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.2
By way of preliminary objections, presented on November 30, 1961, the
Government of South Africa attacked the jurisdiction of the Court. The
Court, finding that it had jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of the dispute,
'By Order of 20 May 1961, the Court found that Ethiopia and Liberia were in the same
interest, and consolidated the two proceedings to which reference is usually made as the
South West Africa cases (ICJ REPORTS 1961, p. 13).
2See the summaries of the consolidated cases prepared by the Registry of the Court and
published in 19 ICJ YEARBOOK-1964-1965, p. 81; 20 ICJ YEARBOOK-1965-1966, p. 83;
and 22 ICJ YEARBOOK- 1967-1968, p. 133.
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dismissed the objections in its judgment of December 21, 1962 (ICJ
Reports 1962, p. 319). The Court found that the jurisdictional clause in the
mandate of the League of Nations, which provided for a reference of
disputes to the Permanent Court of International Justice, was now, by
virtue of Article 37 of the Court's Statute, to be construed as a reference to
the present Court. The Court emphasized, in its later opinion on the merits
(ICJ Reports 1966, p. 6), that its decision of 1962 on the question of
competence was rendered without prejudice to the question of survival of
the mandate, which pertained to the merits, and which was not at issue in
1962 except in the sense that survival had to be assumed for the purpose of
determining the purely jurisdictional issue which was all that was then
before the Court.
The case then proceeded, albeit slowly, on the merits. South Africa filed
a counter-memorial in January, 1964, and Ethiopia and Liberia a reply in
June, 1964; and South Africa filed its rejoinder prior to the extended
deadline of December 23, 1964. South Africa contended that the whole
mandate for South West Africa had lapsed on the dissolution of the League
of Nations, so that South Africa could no longer be subject to any legal
obligations under it; and, alternatively, that if it should be held that the
mandate subsisted, then (a) South Africa's former obligations under it to
account to the League of Nations ceased upon dissolution of that body,
and were not replaced by any similar obligations relative to supervision by
the United Nations, and (b) South Africa had not violated its obligations as
stated in the mandate or in Article 22 of the League Covenant, as alleged
by applicants.
The cases thus having become ready for hearing, the oral proceedings
opened on March 15, 1965, but the Court was met immediately with an
objection by South Africa to the composition of the Court. After a hearing
in camera on that objection, the Court, by order dated March 18, 1965,
overruled the objection (ICJ Reports 1965, p. 3). From March 18 to April
26, the parties presented their oral arguments on the questions of law
before the Court.
In the meantime, on March 30, 1965, South Africa filed another plea,
this time for an inspection in loco. From April 27 to May 4, the Court
heard the parties on that application, and on May 24, 1965, announced that
it would not render any decision thereon prior to completion of the oral
proceedings on the merits. Those hearings continued until July 14, and
then from September 20 until November 29, 1965. On the latter date, the
Court denied South Africa's request for an inspection in loco-by eight
votes to six in respect of the proposals concerning South West Africa, and
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by nine votes to five as to the proposals concerning other regions in Africa
(ICJ Reports 1965, at p. 9).
The issues raised by the parties in the course of the proceeding were,
inter alia: whether the mandate for South West Africa was still in force,
and, if so, whether the mandatory's obligation to furnish annual reports on
its administration to the Council of the League of Nations had become
transformed into an obligation to make such reports to the General Assem-
bly of the United Nations; whether the respondent had, in accordance with
the mandate, promoted to the utmost the material and moral well-being,
and the social progress, of the inhabitants of the mandated territory; wheth-
er the mandatory had contravened the prohibition in the mandate of the
"military training of the natives" and the establishment of military or naval
bases or the erection of fortifications in the territory; and whether South
Africa had contravened the provision in the mandate that it can only be
modified with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations, by
attempting to modify the mandate without the consent of the United
Nations General Assembly, which, it was contended by the applicants, had
replaced the Council of the League for this and other purposes.
However, in rendering its decision, on July 18, 1966 (ICJ Reports 1966,
p. 6), the Court concluded that, before it should resolve these issues, it
should first determine the applicants' jus standi, that is, their legal right or
interest to stand in judgment regarding the subject-matter of their claims.
Throughout its opinion, the Court sought to meet contentions that its
judgment of 1962 constituted an adjudication of the right of applicants to
institute the proceeding. While the Court recognized that it had held that
the members of a dissolved international organization may be deemed,
though no longer members of it, to retain rights which they possessed as
members when the organization existed, it held that this could not be
extended to ascribe to them, upon and by reason of the dissolution, rights
which they never did possess, even previously as members. The Court also
rejected the contention that the question of applicants' standing had been
settled in its 1962 judgment and could not now be reopened, for the reason
that a preliminary objection could never be preclusive of a matter per-
taining to the merits, whether or not it had in fact been dealt with in
connection with the preliminary objection.
Moreover, while the Court conceded that its 1962 judgment had decided
that applicants were entitled to invoke the jurisdictional clause of the
mandate, it held that it still remained incumbent upon them to establish, on
the merits, that they had such a right or interest in the performance of
South Africa under those provisions of the mandate which they invoked, as
International Lawyer, Vol. 5, No. 3
554 INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
to entitle them to the pronouncements and declarations that they were
seeking from the Court. Next, adverting to the question of admissibility,
the Court reiterated that the 1962 judgment had simply found that it had
jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the merits, but that, if any question of
admissibility were involved, it must be decided now, as had occurred in the
merits phase of the Nottebohm case;3 and accordingly, considering the
matter from the point of view of capacity of the applicants to advance their
present claim, the Court would hold that they did not have such capacity,
and hence the claim was inadmissible.
Turning to the primary questions underlying the issue of applicants'
interest, the Court noted that the mandate system had been instituted by
Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations; that the principal
element of each instrument of mandate was the "conduct" provision which
defined the mandatory's powers and its obligations in respect of the in-
habitants of the territory and toward the League and its organs; and that, in
addition, there were "special interest" provisions which conferred certain
rights relative to the mandated territory directly upon the members of the
League as individual States, or in favor of their nationals.
The Court found that the dispute then before it related exclusively to the
"conduct" provisions, and that the applicants appeared before the Court in
their capacity as former members of the League of Nations and the rights
claimed by them were those invested in the members of the League.
Further, after reviewing the juridical character and structure of the League
of Nations, under which action by the League could be effected only
through the instrumentality of its Assembly and Council, with individual
member States being unable themselves to act on League matters, and the
mandatories were to be agents of the League and not of its members
individually; noting various provisions of Article 22 of the Covenant
and the manner in which the mandatory instruments themselves were
drafted, evidencing the absence of any right of intervention by individual
members of the League to stand in judgment relative to the mandatories
nor of any legal right or interest in the conduct of the mandate; and
analyzing various provisions of the jurisdictional clause of the mandate
(Art. 7, par. 2) as adjectival and not substantive in nature and effect (that
is, a jurisdictional clause by conferring competence on the Court thereby
and of itself has not conferred a substantive right), the Court concluded
that the applicants could not be considered to have established any legal
right or interest appertaining to them in the subject-matter of their claims.
ICJ Reports, p. 6.
3 Liechtenstein v. Guatemala, Folio No. 18, Second Phase, Judgment of 6 April 1955,
ICJ REPORTS 1955, p. 4.
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While the foregoing is the official opinion of the Court, it was, in fact, the
decision of only seven of the fourteen members then sitting.4 President Sir
Percy Spender, and six other judges (including Judge ad hoc van Wyk)
voted to reject the claims, while Vice President Wellington Koo and six
other judges (including Judge Jessup of the United States and Judge ad hoc
Mbanefo) voted to uphold the applicants' right to assert the claims, and the
deciding vote was then cast by the President in favor of rejecting the
claims. South West Africa, Second Phase, Judgment (18 July 1966), ICJ
Reports 1966, p. 6.
Thus, after five years of litigation on the claims of Ethiopia and Liberia,
the Court failed to decide the compelling substantive legal questions
presented, through the procedural circumstance which gave the President
of the Court a double (casting) vote.
With this decision of the International Court of Justice recognizing that
only the appropriate organs of the League of Nations (or its successor),
and not any of its individual members, had the right to press a claim against
South Africa with respect to the South West Africa mandate, the interested
member States turned once more to the United Nations. On October 27,
1966, the General Assembly resolved that the mandate for South West
Africa had been terminated, and that the United Nations "must discharge
those responsibilities with respect to South West Africa" [Resolution
2145(XXI)], and thereafter confirmed this resolution in various other reso-
lutions in which, inter alia, it proclaimed "that, in accordance with the
desires of its people, South West Africa shall henceforth be known as
'Namibia.' " On March 20, 1969, the Security Council called on the Gov-
ernment of South Africa "to immediately withdraw its administration from
the territory" [Resolution 264 (1969)]. On August 12, 1969, the Council
called on the Government of South Africa to withdraw "in any case before
4 October 1969" [Resolution 269 (1969)]. On January 30, 1970 it estab-
lished an ad hoc sub-committee to study, in consultation with the Secre-
tary-General, ways and means by which the relevant resolutions of the
Council could be implemented effectively [Resolution 276 (1970)].
By Resolution 284 (1970) of 29 July 1970, the Security Council decided,
on the recommendation of the ad hoc sub-committee, to request the In-
4While the Court consists of fifteen members, Judge Badawi had died on August 4, 1965,
and Judge J. Ammoun (Lebanon) was not elected to fill that vacancy until November 16,
1965, and accordingly did not participate in the determination of the South West Africa cases.
See 20 ICJ YEARBOOK- 1965- 1966, 3-4. Judges Bustamante y Rivero and Sir Muhammad
Zafrulla Khan did not participate in the decision. Id., at 91. Sir Louis Mbanefo was chosen
judge ad hoc by Ethiopia and Liberia, and Hon. J. F. van Wyk was chosen judge ad hoc by
South Africa, and served on the fourteen-judge court. Id., at 5-6.
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ternational Court of Justice to render an advisory opinion on the following
question:
What are the legal consequences for States of the continued presence of
South Africa in Namibia, notwithstanding Security Council resolution 276
(1970)? (ICJ Yearbook-1969-1970, p. 112).
In response to the notice given by the President of the Court pursuant to
Article 66, par. 2, of the Statute of the Court, Czechoslovakia, Finland,
France, Hungary, India, Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, South
Africa, the United States and Yugoslavia, as well as the Secretary-General
of the United Nations, submitted written statements. By orders of 26
January 1971, the Court denied the motion of South Africa that the
President and Judges Padilla Nervo and Morozov recuse themselves from
participation in the proceedings; and after having heard the representatives
of South Africa at a closed session on January 27, 1971, the Court denied
(Judge Dillard dissenting), by order of 29 January, the request of that State
for the appointment of a judge ad hoc.
In its communiqu6 of 5 February 197 1, the Registry of the Court
announced that public hearings would begin on February 8, 1971 before
the Court, to be composed of Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan, President;
Ammoun, Vice-President; and Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, Padilla Nervo,
Forster, Gros, Bengzon, Petr6n, Lachs, Onyeama, Dillard, Ignacio-Pinto,
de Castro, Morozov and Jim6nez de Ar6chaga, Judges; and that the follow-
ing organizations and States intended to present oral statements: The
Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Organization of African
Unity, Finland, India, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Republic of
Viet-Nam, South Africa and the United States.
At that first public sitting, the President of the Court announced:
The Court has decided to examine first of all the observations which the
Government of the Republic of South Africa has made in its written state-
ment and in its letter of 14 January 1971, concerning the supposed disability
of the Court to give the advisory opinion requested by the Security Council,
because of political pressure to which the Court, according to the Govern-
ment of the Republic of South Africa, had been or might be subjected.
The Court, after having deliberated, has unanimously decided that it was
not proper for it to entertain these observations, bearing as they do on the
very nature of the Court as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations,
an organ which, in that capacity, acts only on the basis of the law, in-
dependently of all outside influence or interventions whatsoever, in the ex-
ercise of the judicial function entrusted to it alone by the Charter and its
Statute. A court functioning as a court of law can act in no other way.
At the same sitting, Constantine A. Stavropoulos, Under-Secretary-
General and Legal Counsel of the United Nations, presented an oral
statement on the Secretary-General's behalf; and the President of the
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Court requested the representatives of South Africa to reserve for their
oral statement the observations which they had wished to present regarding
a proposal by their government that a plebiscite be organized.
Oral presentations to the Court proceeded, from time to time, from
February 9 through March 17, 1971, the oral statements made by South
Africa's representatives taking up seventeen hearings and those of repre-
sentatives of seven other States, the Organization of African Unity and the
Secretary-General of the United Nations encompassing six hearings.
These statements dealt in particular with the validity and effect of the
resolutions taken by organs of the United Nations with a view to obtaining
an advisory opinion of the Court and to terminating South Africa's man-
date. Some of the speakers also addressed themselves to South Africa's
proposal for holding a plebiscite under the joint supervision.of the Court
and the South African Government.
At the end of the twenty-third public sitting (March 17), the President
announced that the Court could not rule on South Africa's request for a
plebiscite "at the present stage without anticipating, or appearing to antici-
pate, its decision on one or more of the main issues now before it," and
accordingly deferred its holding until a later date. The President also stated
that with respect to the desire of South Africa to supply the Court with
additional factual material concerning the siutation in Namibia, the Court
had concluded that it would not be in a position to determine whether it
requires any additional factual data until it has first been able to examine
some of the legal issues which must be dealt with in any event. Commu-
niqu No. 71/6 March 17, 1971, Registry of the International Court of
Justice.
Since the President has also acknowledged that the Court has "arrived
at the end of this phase of oral hearings," it is possible that the Court's
Advisory Opinion will have been rendered by the time of publication of
this note. That opinion, or a report thereof, will be reported in The In-
ternational Lawyer promptly after its rendition.
Thus, the quest for meaningful answers to the questions as to the legal
status of the mandate for South West Africa, the obligations of South
Africa as a result of that mandate, and the consequences for the member
states of the United Nations of South Africa's continued presence in
Namibia, moves forward, however slowly ind painfully. It still remains to
be seen whether that quest, like that of Don Quixote, is-as the history of
the matter may indicate-only an impossible dream.
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